International Law Studies – Volume 40
International Law Documents
U.S. Naval War College (Editor)

The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S.
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.

XVIII. Naval and Air Bases
(Dept. of State Bulletin,

'T ol. III, No. 63, Septc1nber 7, 1940)

Arrangement With Great Britain for the Lease of Naval
and Air Bases

The texts of the 11o~es exchanged between the
British Ambassador at \Vashington and the Secretary of State on Septen1ber 2, 1940, under 'vhich
the Govern111ent of the United States acquired the
right to lease naval and air bases in N e'vfoundland,
and in the islands of Bermuda,· the Bahan1as, J amaica, St. Lucia, Tri11idad, and Antjgua, and i11
Britisl1 Guiana, together 'vith the texts of themessage of the Preside11t to the Congress a11d the opillion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940,
regardi11g the autl1ority of the President to collStlminate this arrangen1ent, are as follows:
The British

A1nb~sador

to the Secretary of State
BRITISH El\IBASSY,

W~hington,

D. 0.,

September~,

191;0.

SIR:

I have the honour under instructions from His J\Iajesty's
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform
you that in view of the friendly and sympathetic interest
of His J\1ajesty's Government in the United l(ingdoin in
the national security of the United States and their desire
to strengthen the ability of the United States to cooperate
effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the 'Vestern Hemisphere, His J\1ajesty's GoYerninent
will secure the grant to the Government of the United States,.
freely and 'vithout consideration, of the lease for immediate
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estublishn1ent and use of naval and air bases and facilities
for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of
Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay
of Bermuda .
Furthermore, in view of the above and in vie"r of the
desire of the United States to acquire additonal air and
naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and
without endeavouring to place a monetary or comn1ercial
value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and
properties involved, His 1\fajesty's Government 'vill make
available to the United States for immediate establishn1ent
and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance
thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the
eastern side of the Baha1nas, the southern coast of Jamaica,
the western coast of St. Lucia, the 'vest coast of Trinidad
in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in British Guiana within fifty miles of Georgetown, in exchange
for naval and military equipn1ent and material 'vhich the
United States Government will transfer to His Majesty's
Government.
_
All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding
paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period
of ninety-nine years, free from all rent and .charges other
than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid
by the United States in order to compensate the owners of
private property for loss by expropriation or damage arisil~g out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in
question.
His Majesty's Governinent, in the leases to be agreed upon,
'vill grant to the United States for the period of the leases
all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased,
and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces
adjacent to or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases, and appropriate
provisions for their control.
'Vithout prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the
United States authorities and their jurisdiction 'vithin the
leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation bet,veen the
jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States 'vithin
414559-41-6
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these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the
territories in which these areas are situated, shall be determined by common agreement.
The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the
necessary seaward, coast and antiaircraft defences, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common
agree1nent.
His 1\Iajesty's Govern1nent are prepared to designate imInecliately experts to meet \vith experts of the United States
for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to
agree in any particular situation, except in the case of
Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled
by the Secretary of State of the United States and· His
l\fajesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
I have [etc.]
LOTHIAN

1,he Honourable CoRDELL HuLL,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. 0.

The Secretary of State to the British
Ambassador
DEPARTl\IENT OF STATE,

Washington,

September~,

1940.

ExcELLEXCY :
I haT"e received your note of September 2, 1940, of which
the text is as follows :
rHere follo\VS text of the note, printed above.]
I a1n directed by the President to reply to your note
as follo·w·s:
The Govern1nent of the United States appreciates the
declarations and the generous action of His 1\fajesty's Government as contained in your communication which are
destined to enhance the national security of the United
States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate
effectively "~ith the other nations of the Americas in the
defense of the 1Vestern He1nisphere. It therefore gladly
accepts the proposals.
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The Government of the United States will immediately
designate experts to meet with experts designated by His
Majesty's Government to determine upon the exact location
of the naval and air bases mentioned in your communication
under ackno'v ledgment.
In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the
Government of the United States will immediately transfer
to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy destroyers generally referred to as the twelve hundred-ton
type.
CoRDELL HuLL
Accept [etc.]
His Excellency
The Right Honorable
THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN, C.H.,

British Ambassador.
Message of the President

To THE CoNGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress
notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1940,
under which this Government has acquired the right to
lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the
islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, ahd Antigua, and in British Guiana; also a copy of an
opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940,
regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement.
The right to bases in N e,vfoundland and Bermuda are
gifts-generously given and gladly received. The other
bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty
of our over-age destroyers.
This is not inconsistent in any sense with our status of
peace. Still less is it a threat against any nation. It is
an epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger.
Preparation for defense is an inalienable prerogative of
a sovereign state. Under present circumstances this exercise of sovereign right is essential to the maintenance of
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our peace and safety. This is the n1ost in1portant action in
the reinforcenlent or our national defense that has been
taken since the Louisiana Purchase. Then as now: considerations or safety Il'Olll overseas attack ·were iundanlental.
The value to the estern He1nisphere of these outposts of
security is beyond calculation. Their need has long been
recognized by our country, and especially by those pri1narily
charged 'Yith the duty of charting and organizing our own
naval and 1nilitary defense. They are· essential to the protection or the Panan1a Canal, Central America, the Northern
portion or South America, The Antilles, Canada, l\.fexico,
and our own Eastern and Gulf Seaboards. Their consequent i1nportance in he1nispheric ·defense is obvious. For
these reasons I }~ave taken advantnge -or the present opportunity to acquire the1n.
· ·
FnANJ{LIN D. RoosEvEI.JT
TIIE WHITE HousE,
Septentber 3, 1940.

''r

0 pinion of the Attorney Gene,--az
AuousT 27, 1940:
THE PRESIDENT,

The 1Vhite House,
l\f Y DEAR l\fR. PRESIDENT :

In accordance with your request I have considered your
constitutional and statutory authority to proceed by Executive Agreement with the British Govern1nent inunediatcly
to acquire for the United States certain off-shore naval and
air bases in the Atlantic Ocean wi_thout awaiting the inevitable delays which ·would accon1pany the conelusion of a
forma 1 treaty.
The essential characteristics or the proposal are :
(a) The United States to acquire rights for i1n1nediate
establishment and use of naval and air bases in N e,yfoundland, Bermuda, the Baha1nas, Jainaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad
and British Guiana; such rights to endure for a period of
99 years and to include ndequate provisions for nccess to. and
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defense o:f, such bases and appropriate provisions :for their·
control.
(b) In consideration it is proposed to transfer to Great
Britain the title and possession o:f certain over-age ships
and obsolescent military materials now the property o:f the
United States, and certain other small patrol boats which
though nearly completed are already obsolescent.
(c) Upon such transfer all obligation o:f the United States
is discharged. The acquisition consists only o:f rights, which
the United States 1nay exercise or not at its option, and i:f
exercised may abandon \vithout consent. The privilege o:f
maintaining such bases is subject only to limitations necessary to reconcile United States use \vith the sovereignty retained by Great Britain. Our govern1nent assumes no responsibility :for civil administration o:f any territory. It
1nakes no promise to erect structures, or n1aintain :forces
at any point. It undertakes no defense of the possessions
o:f any country. In short it acquires optional bases which
rnay be developed as Congress appropriates :funds therefor,
but the United States does not assun1e any continuing or :future obligation, commitment or alliance.
The questions of constitutional and statutory authority,
with \vhich alone I am concerned, see1n to be these.
First. ~iay such an acquisition be concluded by the President under an Executive Agreen1ent or must it be negotiated
as a Treaty subject to ratification by the Senate~
Second. Does authority exist in the President to alienate
the title to such ships and obsolescent 1naterials, and i:f so,
on what conditions 1
Third. Do the statutes o:f the United States limit the right
to deliver the so-called "mosquito boats" now under construction or the over-age destroyers by reason of the belligerent
status of Great Britain~
I
There is, of course, no doubt concerning the authority of
the President to negotiate \Yith the British Government
for the proposed exchange. The only questions that 1night
be raised in connection there\vith are (1) \vhether the
arrange1nent 1nust be put in the f,orn1 of a treaty and await
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ratification by the Senate or (2) \Yhether there must be
additional legislation by the Congress. Ordinarily (and
assu1ning the absence of enabling legislation) the question
\vhether such an agreement can be concluded under Presidential authority or whether it must a wait ratification by a
two-thirds vote of the United States Senate involves consideration of two po\vers which the Constitution vests in the
President.
One of these is the power of the Commander-in -Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, which is conferred upon the President by the Constitution but is not defined or lilnited. Happily, there has been little occasion in
our history for the interpretation of the powers of the President as Co1nmander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. I
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone to
sustain the present proposal. But it will hardly be open to
controversy that the vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a responsibility to use all constitutional authority \vhich he may possess to provide adequate bases and stations for the utilization of the naval and
air weapons of the United States at their highest efficiency
in our defense. It seems equally beyond doubt that present
world conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is constitutionally avoidable.
The second power to be considered is that control of
foreign relations which the Constitution vests in the President as a part of the Executive function. The nature and
extent of this power has recently been explicitly and authoritatively defined by l\1r. Justice Sutherland, writing
for the Supreme Court. In 1936, in United States v. CurtissWright Export Oorp. et al., 299 U.S. 304, he said:
"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress) but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must
be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of
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the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassinent-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success
for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to
be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a
degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions _which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He
has his confidential sources of infor1nation. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic consular and other officials.
Secrecy in respect of information gathered by the1n may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it
productive of harmful results."
The President's power over foreign relations while "delicate, plenary and exclusive'' is not unlimited. So1ne negotiations involve commitments as to the future "\vhich would
carry an obligation to exercise powers vested in the Congress.
Such Presidential arrangements are customarily submitted
for ratification by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before the
future legislative power of the country is committed. However, the acquisitions which you are proposing to accept
are without express or implied promises on the part of the
United States to be performed in the future. The consideration, which we later discuss, is completed upon transfer of
the specified items. The Executive Agreement obtains an
opportunity to establish naval and air bases for the protection of our coastline but it imposes no obligation upon the
Congress to appropriate money to improve the opportunity.
It is not necessary for the Senate to ratify an opportunity
that entails no obligation.
There are precedents which might be cited, but not all
strictly pertinent. The proposition falls far short in magnitude of the acquisition by President Jefferson of the Louisiana Territory from a belligerent during a European war,
the Congress later appropriating the consideration and the
Senate later ratifying a treaty embodying .the agreement.
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I am also ren1inded that in 1850, Secretary of State Daniel
ebster acquired Horse Shoe Reef, at the entrance of
Buffalo Harbor, upon condition that the United States would
engage to erect a lighthouse and n1aintain a light but '-vould
erect no fortification thereon. This ''as done 'vithout awaiting legislatiYe authority. Subsequently the Congress made
appropriations for the lighthouse, """hich 'vas erected in
1856. IIIalloy, Treaties and Conventions, Vol. 1, p. 663.
It is not believed, however, that it is necessary here to
rely exclusively upon your constitutional po-wer. 1\.s pointed
out hereinafter (in discussing the second question), I think
there is alEo an1ple statutory authority to support the acquisition of these bases, and the precedents perhaps n1ost nearly
in point are the numerous acquisitions of rights in foreign
countries for sites of diplomatic and cor1sular establislunentsperhaps also the trade agree1nents recently negotiated under
statutory authority and the acquisition in 1903 of the coaling
and naval stations and rights in Cuba under the act of
l\farch 2, 1901, c. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 898. In the lastmentioned case the agreement was subsequently e1nbodied
in a treaty but it -was only one of a number of undertakings,
some clearly of a nature to be dealt with ordinarily by
treaty, and the statute had required "that by way of further
assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a pern1anent treaty with the United
States."
The transaction now proposed represents only an exchange
with no statutory requirement for the embodiment thereof in
any treaty and involving no promises or undertakings by the
United States that might raise the question of the propriety
of incorporation in a treaty. I therefore advise that acquisition by Executive Agreement of the rights proposed to be
conveyed to the United States by Great Britain will not
require ratification by the Senate.

''r

II
'fhe right of the President to dispose of vessels of the
Navy and unneeded naval material finds clear recognition
in at least t''-ro enact1nents of the Congress and a decision of
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the Supreme Court-and any who assert that the authority
does not exist must assume the burden of establishing that
both the Congress and the Supreme Court meant something
' less than the clear import of seemingly plain language.
By section 5 of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 141, 22 Stat.
582, 599-600 (U. S. C., title 34, sec. 492), the Congress
placed restrictions upon the Inethods to be followed by
the Secretary of the Navy in disposing of naval vessels,
which have been found unfit for further use and stricken
from the naval registry, but by the last clause of the section recognized and confirmed such a right in the President
free from such limitations. It provides :
"But no vessel of the Navy shall hereafter be sold in any
other manner than herein provided, or for less than such
appraised value, unless the President of the United States
shall otherwi8rJ· direct in writing." (Underscoring [this
print, italics] supplied.)
In Levinson v. United States, 285 U. S. 198, 201, the
Supre1ne Court said of this statute that "the po,ver of the
President to direct a departure from the statute is not
confined to a sale for less than the appraised value but
extends to the manner of the sale," and that "the word
'unless' qualifies both the requirements of the concluding
clause."
So far as concerns this statute, in 1ny opinion it leaves
the President u.s Co1nmander-in-Chief of the Navy :free to
1nake such disposition of naval vessels as he finds necessary
in the public interest, and I find nothing that would indicate
that the Congress has tried to li1nit the President's plenary
po·wers to vessels already stricken from the naval registry.
The President, of course, would exercise his powers only
under the high sense of responsibility \vhich follows his rank
as Co1nmander-in-Chief of his nation's defense forces.
Furthermore, I find in no other statute or in the decisions
any attempted limitations upon the plenary powers of the
President as Comn1ander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
and as the head of the State in its relations with foreign
countries to enter into the proposed arrange1nents for the
transfer to the British Government of certain over-age destroyers and obsolescent n1ilitary Inaterial except the li1ni-
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tations recently imposed by section 14 (a) of the act of
J nne 28, 1940 (Public No. 671). 1,his section, it 'vill be
noted, clearly recognizes the authority to n1ake transfers
and seeks only to impose certain restrictions thereon. The
section reads as follows:
''SEc. 14. (a) Notwithstanding the provision of any other
law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft, munitions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United States
has title, in whole or in part, or which have been contracted for, shall hereafter be transferred, exchang~d, sold,
or otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever unless
the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of naval material,
and the Chief of Staff of the Army in the case of military
1naterial, shall first certify that such material is not essential
to the defense of the United States."
Thus to prohibit action by the constitutionally-created
Conunander-in-Chief except upon authorization of a statutory officer subordinate in rank is of questionable constitutionality. However, since the statute requires certification only of matters as to which you would wish, irrespective of the statute, to be satisfied, and as the legislative
history of the section indicates that no arbitrary res~riction
is intended, it seems unnecessary to raise the question of
constitutionality which such a provision would otherwise
invite.
I am informed that the destroyers involved here are the
survivors of a fleet of over 100 built at about the same time
and under the same design. During the year 1930, 58 of
these were decommissioned with a view toward sera pping
and a corresponding number were recommissioned as
replace1nents. Usable material and equipment from the
58 vessels removed from the service were transferred
to the reco1nmissioned vessels to recondition and modernize them, and other usable material and equipment
were removed and the vessels stripped. They were then
stricken from the navy register, and 50 of them were sold
as scrap for prices ranging from $5,260 to $6,800 per vessel,
and the remaining 8 were used for such purposes as target
vessels, experimental construction tests, and temporary barracks. The surviving destroyers no'v under consideration
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have been reconditioned and are in service, but all of them
are over-age, most o:f them by several years.
In construing this statute in its application to such a
situation it is in1portant to riote that this subsection as
originally proposed in the Senate 9ill provided that the
appropriate staff officer shall first certify that "such material
is not essential to and cannot be used in the defense o:f the
United States." Senator Barkley and others objected to
the subsection as so worded on the ground that it would
prevent the release and exchange of surplus or used planes
and other supplies :for sale to the British and that it would
consequently nullify the provisions o:f the bill (see section 1
of the act of July 2, 1940, H. R. 9850, Public No. 703) which
the Senate had passed several days earlier :for that very
purpose. Although Senator Walsh stated that he did not
think the proposed subsection had that effect, he agreed
to strike out the words "and cannot be used." Senator
Barkley observed that he thought the modified language
provided "a much more elastic term." Senator 'Valsh :further stated that he would bear in mind in conference the
views of Senator Barkley and others, and that he had "no
desire or purpose to go beyond the present Jaw, but to have
some certificate filed as to whether the property is surplus
or not." (Cong. Rec., June 21, 1940, pp. 13370-13371)
In view of this legislative history it is clear that the Congress did not intend to prevent the certification for transfer,
exchange, sale or disposition of property merely because it
is still used or usable or of possible value :for :future use.
The statute does not contemplate mere transactions in scrap,
yet exchange or sale except as sera p would hardly be possible if confined to material whose usefulness is entirely
gone. It need only be certified as not essential, and "essential," usually the equivalent of vital or indispensable, :falls
far short o:f "used~' or "usable."
Moreover, as has been indicated, the congressional authorization is not merely o:f a sale, which might imply only a
cash transaction. It also authorizes equipment to be "transferred", "exchanged" or "other,vise disposed o:f"; and in
connection with material of this kind :for which there is
no open market value is never absolute but only relative-
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and chiefly related to " ·hat nuty be had in exchange or
replacement.
In vie'v of the character of the transactions contemplated,
as 'veil as the legislative history, the conclusion is inescapable that the Congress has not sought by section 14 (a)
to i1npose an arbitrary limitation upon the judg1nent of the
highest staff officers as to "·hether a transfer, exchange or
other disposition of specific items "~auld impair our essential defenses; Specific items must be weighed in relation
to our total defense position before and after an exchange
or disposition. Any other construction would be a virtual
prohibition of any sale, exchange or disposition of 1naterial
or supplies so long as they ""ere capable of use, however ineffective, and such a prohibition obviously 'vas not: and "·as
not intended to be, written into the law.
It is 1ny opinion that in proceeding under section 14 (a)
appropriate staff officers may and should consider remaining useful life, strategic i1nportance, obsolescence, and all
other factors affecting defense value, not only 'vith respect
to what the Govern1nent of the United States gives up in
any exchange or transfer, but also with respect to 'vhat the
Govern1nent receives. In this situation good business sense
is good legal sense.
I therefore advise that the appropriate staff officers n1ay,
and should, certify under section 14 (a) that ships and
n1aterial involved in a sale or exchange are not essential
to the defense of the United States if in their judgment
the consununation of i he transaction does not impair or
weaken the total defense of the United States, and certainly so where the consummation of the arrange1nent ""'ill
strengthen the total defensive position of the nation.
''rith specific reference . to the proposed agree1nent ivith
the Govenunent of Great Britain for the acquisition of naval
and air bases, it is 1ny opinion that the Chief of Naval
Operations may, and should~ certify under section 14 (a)
that the destroyers involved are not e8sential to the defense
of the United States if in his jndg1nent the exchange of
such destroyers for such naval and air bases ""'ill strengthen
rather than i1npair the totnl defense of the United State8.
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I hnve previously indicated that in n1y opnuon there is
statutory authority for the acquisition of the naval and air
bases in exchange for the vessels and material. 'fhe question was not 1nore fully treated at that point because dependent upon the statutes above discussed and ''hich required consideration in this section of the opinion. It is
to be borne in mind that these statutes clearly recognize
and deal with the authority to 1nake dispositions by sale,
transfer, exchange or otherwise; that they do not in1pose
any limitations concerning individuals, corporations or governlnents to 'vhich such dispositions 1nay be 1nade; and that
they do not specify or litnit in any Inanner the consideration
which may enter into an exchange. There is no reason whatever for holding that sales may not be n1ade to or exchanges 1nade with a foreign goyern1nent or that in such
a case a treaty is contemplated. This is e1nphasized when
we consider that the transactions in son1e cases may be quite
unimportant, perhaps only dispositions of scrap, and that
a do1nestic buyer (unless restrained by son1e authorized contract or e1nbargo) would be quite free to dispose of his purchase as he pleased. Furthermore, section 14 (a) of the
act of June 28, 1940, supra, was enacted by the Congress
in full conten1plation of transfers for ultimate delivery to
foreign belligerent nations. Possibly it n1ay be said that
the authority for exchange of naval vessels and material
presupposes the acquisition of so1nething of value to the
Navy or, at least, to the national defense. Certainly I can
imply no narrower limitation when the law is wholly silent
in this respect. Assun1ing that there is, however, at least
the li:nitation which I have 1nentioned, it is fully met in
the acquisition of rights to maintain needed bases. And
if, as I hold, the statute la'v authorizes the exchange of vessels and material for other vessels and 1naterial or, equally,
for the right to establish bases, it is an inescapable corollary
that the statute law also authorizes the acquisition of the
ships or material or bases which forn1 the consideration for
the exchange.

III

vVhether the statutes of the United States prevent the
dispatch to Great Britain, a belligerent power, of the so-
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called "mosquito boats" no'v under construction or the
over-age destroyers depends upon the interpretation to be
placed on section 3 of title V of the act of June 15, 1917,
c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 222. 'I'his section reads:
"Dllring a "~ar in 'vhich the United States is a neutral
nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdictio~1
of the United States any vessel, built, ar1ned, or equippr.d
as a vessel of "·ar, or converted from a private vessel into
a vessel of 'Yar, "~ith any intent or under any agreement or
contract, written or oral, that such vessel shall be delivered
to a belligerent nation, or to an agent, officer, or citizen of
such nation, or 'vith reasonable cause to believe that the said
vessel shall or 'Yill be e1nployed in the service of any such
belligerent nation after its departure from the jurisdiction
of the United States."
This section must be read in the light of section 2 of the
sa1ne act and the rules of international law 'vhich the Congress states that it was its intention to implement. (H. Rep.
No. 30, 65th Con g., 1st Sess., p. 9.) So read, it is clear that
it is inapplicable to vessels, like the over-age destroyers,
which were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into,
vessels of 'var with the intent that they should enter the
service of a belligerent. If the section 'vere not so construed,
it \vould render meaningless section 2 of the act which authorizes the President to detain any armed vessel until he
is satisfied that it will not engage in hostile operations before·
it reaches a neutral or belligerent port. The two sections
are intelligible and reconcilable only if read in light of the
traditional rules of international la,v. 'I'hese are clearly
stated by Oppenheim in his work on International Law,
5th ed., Vol. 2, sec. 334, pp. 574-576:
"Whereas a neutral is in no 'vise obliged by his duty
of impartiality to prevent his subjects from selling arn1cd
vessels to the belligerents, such armed vessels being merely
contraband of \Var, a neutral is bound to employ the means
at his disposal to prevent his subjects from building, fitting
out, or arming, to the order of either belHgerent, vesse.is
intended to be used as men-of-war, and to prevent the departure from his j11risdiction of any vessel which, by order
of either belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use. The
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· difference between selling armed vessels to belligerents and
building them to order is usually defined in the following
way:
"An ar1ned ship, being contraband of 'var, is in no 'vise
different from other kinds of contraband, provided that she
is not manned in a neutral port, so that she can co1nmit
hostilities at once after having reached the open sea. 1\
subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship, or arms a
merchantman, not to the order of a belligerent, but intenJing to sell her to a belligerent, does not differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends to sell them to a belligerent.
There is nothing to prevent a neutral £ro1n allo,ving his
subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver then1 to belligerents, either in a neutral port or in a belligerent
port * * *
"On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds ar1ned
ships to the order of a belligerent, he prepares the n1eans
of naval operations, since the ships, on sailing outside the
neutral territorial waters and takjng in a crew and amn1un ition, can at once commit hostilities. Thus, through the
carrying out of the order of the belligerent, the neutral territory has been made the base of naval operations; and as the
duty of impartiality includes an obligation to prevent either
belligerent from making neutral territory the base of military or naval operations, a neutral violates his neutrality by
not preventing his subjects from carrying out an order of
a belligerent for the building and fitting out of Inen-of-wat.
This distinction, although of course logically correct, is hairsplitting. But as, according to the present la,v, neutral
States need not prevent their subjects from supplying arn1s
and ammunition to belligerents, it will probably continue to
be drawn."
Viewed in the light of the above, I am of the opinion
that this statute does prohibit the release and transfer to
the British Government of the so-called "mosquito boats''
now under construction for the United States Navy. If
these boats were released to the British Government, it
would be legally impossible for that Government to take
the1n out of this country after their completion, since to the
extent of such completion at least they would have been built~
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anned, or equipped 'vith the intent, or 'vith reasonable cause
to believe, that they would enter the service of a belligerent
after being sent out of the jurisdiction of the United States.
This "rill not be true, ho,vever, 'vith respect to the overage destroyers, since they 'vere clearly not built, armed, or
equipped 'vith any such intent or with reasonable cause to
believe that they would ever enter the service of a belligerent.
In this connection it has been noted that during the war
bet 'veen Russia and Japan in 1904 and 1905, the German
Govern1nent permitted the sale to Russia of torpedo boats
and also of ocean liners belonging to its auxiliary navy.
See "\Vheaton's International Law, 6th ed. (l{eith), Vol. 2,
p. 977.
IV
Accordingly, you are respectfully advised:
(a) That the proposed arrangement may be concluded as
an Exectitive Agreement, effectiYe "rithout a'vaiting ratification.
(b) That there is presidential power to transfer title and
possession of the proposed considerations upon certification
by a ppropriat.e staff officers.
(c) That the dispatch of the so-called "1nosquito boats"
'vould constitute a violation of the statute la'v of the United
States, but with that exception there is no legal obstacle to
the consummation of the transaction, in accordance, of
course, 'vith the applicable provisions of the Neutrality Act
as to delivery.
Respectfully submitted,
RoBERT

H.

JACKSON,

Attorney General.

